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This brief is submitted by Defendant/Appellant Century 21
Mining

(hereinafter

heretofore

filed

"Century")

by

in

reply

Plaintiff/Appellee

to

Lowell

the

brief

E. Potter

(hereinafter "Potter"),
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The claim that Century knew of the default judgment for
a long period before filing its Motion to Set Aside Judgment
is not supported by the record and is diametrically opposed to
Potterfs position in related litigation.
The claim that Potter was not obligated to notify Century
of the entry of the default judgment is contrary to the legal
authorities on the subject.

On the contrary, the legal

authorities confirm that Potter had a duty to disclose the
entry of the default judgment.
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLAIM THAT CENTURY
KNEW OF THE ENTRY OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR A LONG
PERIOD PRIOR TO FILING ITS MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT
In his Brief, Potter repeatedly asserts that Century
negotiated with Potter with respect to the default judgment
for a long period of time before Century filed its Motion to
Set Aside Judgment.

The apparent purpose of the claim is to

create the appearance that Century knew of the judgment for a

1

considerable period of time before filing its Motion to Set
Aside Judgment.
Potter's claim that Century knew of the judgment by
reason of a long period of negotiation is based upon two vague
statements in Potter's Affidavit,

Each of these statements

will be separately addressed to demonstrate the lack of merit
to Potter's claims.
The first statement claiming Century's prior knowledge of
the judgment is in paragraph 2(e) of Potter's Affidavit
wherein

he

states

that the

judgment

was

"disclosed

in

corporate statements and pro-formas long before this Motion
was filed."

(R. 73).

Copies of the alleged "corporate

statements and pro-formas" containing the "disclosures" are
noticeably absent from the Affidavit.
In order to demonstrate Potter's bad faith in claiming
that Century disclosed the judgment in its corporate financial
statements prior to filing the Motion to Set Aside the
judgment, Century calls attention of the Court to a complaint
which was filed by Potter in related litigation on or about
October 6, 1992.

In the complaint, Potter asserts the exact

opposite position that he takes in his Brief in this action.
In paragraphs 7, 8 and 12 of the complaint in the related
action, Potter alleged that the existence of the judgment had
2

not been disclosed in corporate financial statements, A copy
of the complaint in the related litigation is attached as
Addendum Exhibit "A". Moreover, financial statements produced
in the related litigation establish that the judgment was not
mentioned in financial statements until 1991, after Century
filed its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.
The other reference in Potter's Affidavit that Century
knew of the judgment at an earlier point in time is contained
in paragraph 4 of the Affidavit (R. 73), wherein Potter claims
that "Defendants entered into negotiations for settlement of
the judgment with me," However, there is no suggestion that
such negotiations occurred prior to December, 1989, when
Century acknowledged it first learned of the judgment.
The evidence establishes that the first notice that
Century received concerning the existence of the default
judgment occurred in December, 1989 (Drage Affidavit, f 11,
R. 52).

It was only after learning of the judgment in

December, 1989, that Century attempted negotiations with
Potter for a period of approximately two and one-half months.
When the negotiations failed, Century filed its Motion to Set
Aside on February 26, 1990 (R. 23).

Thus, there was no

unreasonable delay in filing the Motion to Set Aside.

3

In

reviewing

Potterfs Affidavit, one

further

false

statement should be noted by the Court. In paragraph 2(a) of
his Affidavit (R. 72), Potter claims that the Promissory Note
involved in this action was executed in settlement of 1987
action.

Such statement could not possibly be true. The 1987

action was filed on March 18, 1987 (R. 43). By Potter's own
admission, the Promissory Note involved in this action was
executed on February 28, 1986 (Complaint, f 15, R. 4 ) , more
than one year prior to the filing of the 1987 action.
POINT II
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT WAS REQUIRED IN THIS CASE
On page 7 of his brief, Potter argues that in the
circumstances of this case, he was not obligated to give
Century notice of the default judgment.

In support of this

argument, Potter cites Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company
v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992).
The Lincoln Benefit case provides no support whatsoever for
Potter's argument. On the contrary, the Lincoln Benefit case
confirms the obligation of a party to provide notice of a
default judgment.

The decision states that failure to give

notice does not invalidate the judgment, but confirms that
such failure "is an important factor in determining the
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timeliness of post-judgment proceedings, where an exact time
is not prescribed."
Century has never asserted that non-compliance with the
notice requirements of Rule 58A(d) invalidates the default
judgment. However, Century contends that Potter's failure to
give notice should be an important factor in determining the
timeliness of Century's Motion to Set Aside the default
judgment.

Thus, the Lincoln Benefit case supports Century's

position.
It should further be noted that Defendant in the Lincoln
Benefit case received notice of the entry of the judgment in
the form of service of an Order and Supplemental Proceedings.
In the instant case, Potter took no enforcement action prior
to the Motion to Set Aside for the apparent purpose of
concealing the existence of the default and thereby inducing
Century to delay filing its Motion to Set Aside.
Potter should not be permitted to benefit by any delay in
filing Motion to Set Aside inasmuch as his non-compliance with
the notice requirements of Rules of Procedure was the cause of
such delay.
CONCLUSION
The claim that Century knew of the judgment prior to
December, 1989, is not supported by the record before the

5

Court and is diametrically opposed to Potter's position in
related litigation. Century first learned of the judgment in
December, 1989, and thereafter took appropriate action to
assert its rights.
Potter violated his duty to give notice of the entry of
the default judgment and should not be permitted to benefit by
the delay which was caused by his non-compliance with the
express mandates of the procedjiral rules.
DATED this [^

day of July,I 1993.

Rdbett M. McDonald

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true
and accurate copy of the foregoing Reply Brief this
of July, 1993, to the following:
J. Ray Barrios
First American [Tit]}ie Building
330 East 400 South, Suite ,250
Salt Lake City,\UT
[1
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

Complaint in Related Litigation

EXHIBIT B:

Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

J. RAY BARRIOS, P.C.
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE BUILDING
330 East 400 South, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-3762
Attorney for Lowell E. Potter
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
LOWELL E. POTTER,
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT
vs.
TV COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK,
INC. a Colorado corporation,
and CENTURY 21 MINING, INC.,
a Utah corporation a
subsidiary of TVCN, Inc.,
OMAR A. DUWAIK, individual,
and JOHN DOES I-X,
individuals,

Civil No. <fc**to£S"SA-<=*>

Judge -_ u - A. £pu*U

Defendants,
Plaintiff, Lowell E. Potter, above named, for causes of
action as against the above named Defendants, states and alleges
as follows:
PARTIES
1. Defendant TV Communications Network, Inc. is a Colorado
corporation authorized to do business in the State of Colorado
with it's principal place of business in Denver, Colorado, is
registered

with the Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC File #
1.

33-16113-D, and is a publicly traded company.
2. Defendant Century 21 Mining, Inc. is a Utah corporation
authorized to do business in Utah and Colorado with it's current
principal

place of business in Denver, Colorado, is registered

with the Securities & Exchange Commission as being owned by TV
Communications Network, Inc.
3. Defendant Omar A. Duwaik is the President of TV
Communications, Inc. and is an individual with his principal
place of residence in Colorado.
4. Defendants John Does I-X are

officers, directors, and/or

persons providing information for the disclosures to the
Securities & Exchange Commission, whose names

are unknown at the

present time.
5. Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Utah, is a
stockholder in Century 21 Mining, Inc., an is the creditor
beneficiary of a judgment against Century 21 Mining, Inc.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
6. Defendants, TV Communications Network, Inc., Century 21
Mining, Inc., and Omar A. Duwaik in his capacity of

President of

TV Communications Network, Inc. and as an individual have
disclosed to the public and the Securities &
that TV Communications Network, Inc. has

Exchange Commission

purchased a controlling

interest of Century 21 Mining, Inc., and that such purchase has
resulted in the following:
(a) That the assets of Century 21 Mining, Inc. are part
of the assets of TV Communications Network, Inc.;
2.

(b) That Century 21 Mining, Inc. owns 1060 Acres of a
mining property located in Sierra County, California, known as
the Mountain House Mine;
(c) That total outstanding liabilities of Century 21
Mining, Inc. were all negotiated and settled, or to be settled
for transfer of stock in TV Communications Network, Inc.;
(d) That the assets of the two corporations as combined
included all notes and/or judgment payable as disclosed.
7. The Defendants, and each of them, knew the above stated
facts to be false, yet did not include any
a judgment obtained by Plaintiff

information regarding

against Century 21 Mining, Inc.

on December 15, 1988 in the amount of $90,000.00 with interest
accruing at the rate of 18% per annum.
8. Defendants, and each of them, knew of the Plaintiff's
judgment, and the fact that Plaintiff and Defendants had not
reached any settlement regarding such judgment, yet failed to
disclose the

amount judgment or the fact

that such judgment had

not been settled or satisfied.
IX * The

California mining claims were not

owned by Century

21 Mining, Inc. at the time of disclosure, and whatever asset
value such mining claims have or may have, which have been
disclosed on the

TV Communications Network, Inc. 10-Q filings to

the Securities & Exchange Commission, could not
as

an asset

on the

books and

properly be used

financial disclosures

of either

Century 21 Mining, Inc. or TV Communications Network, Inc.
10. Such failure to disclose material, or to disclose false,
3.

information to potential buyers, and to the Securities & Exchange
Commission was done so by Defendants knowingly.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
11. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1
through 10 above as if each were set forth at length herein.
12. Defendants knowingly and fraudulently failed to disclose
that Plaintiff

had a money

judgment against Century

21 Mining,

Inc. that had not been settled or satisfied at the time of the
disclosure of assets and liabilities

of Century 21 Mining,

Inc.

to the public and to the Securities & Exchange Commission.
13. Such information was and is material information as to
knowledge regarding the financial condition of the companies,
Century 21 Mining, Inc. and TV Communications Network, Inc.
14. Such failure to disclose such material information
violates the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, as it
read at the time of the false disclosures, and/or omissions.
15. Plaintiff, as a stockholder of Century 21 Mining, Inc.
has been damaged in that the claimed recorded interest of TV
Communications, Inc. in Century 21 Mining, Inc. of 65.3% of the
book value of Century 21 Mining,

Inc. of $5,000,000.00 does not

exist, and Plaintiff's stock is essentially worthless.
16. Defendant,
all

stockholders of

Communications, Inc.
based upon

TV Comminications Network,
Century 21 Mining,

Inc. an

stock

21

for Century

using the claimed Century 21
4.

Inc. offered

to

exchange of TV

Mining, Inc.

stock

Mining, Inc. asset, the

"Mountain House Mine", as a major asset in TV Communications,
Inc. finalcial statement to induce the exchange.
17. The offer was not made to Plaintiff, as a holder of twomillion shares

of Century 21 Mining, Inc.

stock pursuant to the

1988 Judgment.
18. Plaintiff has been damaged to the extent of the false
disclosures
House

and/or omission

Mine" asset, and

concerning

for the failure

the

claimed

"Mountain

to exchange Plaintiff's

stock pursuant to TV Communications, Inc. offer, in the amount of
$500,000.00 or such other greater amount as to be proven at trial
of this cause.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
19. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1
through 18 above as if each were set forth at length herein.
"20. TV Communications Network, Inc. and/or Century 21
Mining, Inc. as owned by TV Communications Network, Inc. has
failed and refused to satisfy the Judgment of Plaintiff and has
rendered the assets and stock of Century 21 Mining, Inc.
worthless so Plaintiff cannot satisfy his judgment through the
assets of Century 21 Mining, Inc.
21. Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction against the
further dissipation of the assets of Century 21 Mining, Inc. by
TV Communications Network, Inc. to protect the judgment of
Plaintiff against Century 21 Mining, Inc.
22. Plaintiff will be irreparably harmed if TV
5.

Communications Network, Inc. is allowed to continue to disclose
to the public that the assets of Century 21 Mining, Inc. are part
of it's assets when the largest part of such assets are claimed
to be in the California mining claims which are not owned by
either TV Communications Network, Inc. or Century 21 Mining, Inc.
(See Exhibit "A*, TVCN 1991 Annual Report, attached hereto).
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
23. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1
through 22 above as if each were set forth at length herein.
24. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that TV
Communications Network, Inc. is the sole owner or controlling
owner of Century 21 Mining, Inc. and that all the assets of
Century 21 Mining, Inc. have been transferred to TV
Communications Network, Inc. thus enabling Plaintiff to satisfy
his judgment against Century 21 Mining, Inc. directly against the
assets of TV Communications Network, Inc.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant's, and
each of them, as follows:
1. For $500,000.00 general damages against Defendants, and
each of them, for their knowing, deliberate, willful and
fraudulent disclosures and omissions in securities documents
which

have rendered Plaintiff's stock in Century 21 Mining, Inc.

worthless;
2. For a permanent injunction against the further
dissipation of Century 21 Mining, Inc. assets;
3. For a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff can satisfy his
6.

judgment against Century 21 Mining, Inc. directly from the assets
of TV Communications Network, Inc.;
4. For all Plaintiff's attorney fees and costs of this
action on each of Plaintiff's causes of action;
5. For any further relief the Court deems just and proper in
the premises.

4k

Dated this

day of October, 1992.

PLAINTIFF'S ADDRESS;
428 Pepperridge Drive
Midvale, Utah 84047
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 58A

The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment
and may advance it on the calendar.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 57, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Oil Shale Corp. v. Larson, 20 Utah
2d 369, 438 P.2d 540 (1968).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 22A Am. Jur. 2d Deciaratory Judgments §§ 183, 186, 203 et seq.
C.J.S. — 26 C J.S. Declaratory Judgments
§§ 17, 18, 104, 155.
A.LJL — Right to jury trial in action for

declaratory relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th
146.
Key Numbers. — Declaratory Judgment e»
41, 42, 251, 367.

Rule 58A. Entry.
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed.
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge
and filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all
purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket.
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing party shall
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of this provision.
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be rendered thereon.
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the
defendant, to the following effect:
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is
justly due or to become due;
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same;
179

